Under the Illinois Animal Control Act, a plaintiff seeking to recover injuries from the result of a dog bite must prove: “(1) an attack by defendant’s dog; (2) injury to plaintiff; (3) absence of provocation; and (4) that plaintiff was conducting himself peaceable in a place where he had a legal right to be.” Stehl v. Dose, 83 Ill.App.3d 440, 443 (3rd Dist. 1980). The third element of this burden, absence of provocation, can be a complex area of the law. In Nelson, provocation was initially defined as “an act or process of provoking, stimulation or incitement.” Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill.App.3d 130, 131 (5th Dist. 1976).
Since the Nelson decision, subsequent Illinois Appellate Court decisions have provided some as to what actions constitutes provocation. For example, the court in Stehl v. Dose also stated that a determination of provocation is “primarily a question of whether plaintiff’s actions would be provocative to the dog.” Stehl at 443. In addition, this standard takes into account both “what a person would reasonably expect, and how a normal dog would react in similar circumstances.” Kirkham v. Will, 311 Ill.App.3d 787, 794 (5th Dist. 2000). An unintentional or accidental act can sometimes create provocation, however “where the acts which stimulated or excited the dogs were unintentional … no provocation can be said to exist within the meaning of the statute if the acts cause the dog to attack the plaintiff viciously, and the vicious act is out of proportion to the unintentional acts involved.” Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill.App.3d 581, 589 (5th Dist. 1993).
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